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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
RHANEY v. UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND EASTERN SHORE: 
A LANDLORD DOES NOT OWE HIS TENANT A DUTY TO 
CONTROL THE TORTIOUS ACTS OF A THIRD PERSON 
PROVIDED THE ACTS ARE NOT FORESEEABLE 
By: Jennifer Lewandowski 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a landlord does not 
owe his tenant a duty to control the tortious acts of a third person 
provided that the acts are not foreseeable. Rhaney v. Univ. of Md. E. 
Shore, 388 Md. 585, 880 A.2d 357 (2005). Specifically, a duty does 
not extend to the harm inflicted by a third party whose presence cannot 
reasonably be considered a "dangerous condition," but is instead, an 
unforeseeable danger. Jd. at 599, 880 A.2d at 365. The Court of 
Appeals also clarified that a student is not a business invitee within the 
confines of a dormitory. Jd. at 598, 880 A.2d at 364. 
On October 29, 1998, Anthony F. Rhaney, Jr. ("Rhaney") and 
Ennis Clark ("Clark"), roommates and students enrolled at the 
University of Maryland Eastern Shore ("UMES"), engaged in an 
argument in the confines of their dormitory room. The argument 
consisted of Clark alleging that Rhaney had cracked his fish tank. 
Clark punched Rhaney in the jaw after Rhaney denied cracking the 
tank. 
Clark was involved in two prior altercations resulting in one 
disciplinary action, his suspension from school. Clark's return to 
UMES was contingent upon his participation and completion of 
professional conflict resolution counseling, which he satisfied through 
a Save Our Streets program. UMES did not reveal Clark's previous 
violent incidents to Rhaney prior to placing them as roommates. 
However, Rhaney learned of Clark's previous incidents prior to their 
dispute. 
Rhaney filed a complaint against UMES alleging that UMES was 
negligent in failing to disclose Clark's dangerous propensities, an 
. assault was foreseeable, and UMES breached its duty of care to 
Rhaney as an invitee. The Circuit Court for Somerset County sent the 
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case to trial after denying UMES's motion for summary judgment. 
The jury returned a verdict against UMES. 
UMES appealed in the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
which reversed the circuit court's judgment stating that the evidence 
was insufficient to establish that Clark's assault on his roommate was 
foreseeable. The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Rhaney's 
petition for certiorari to determine whether an incorrect restrictive 
standard of foreseeability was applied and whether an improper 
addition to the law of premises liability was made regarding policy on 
college admission and disciplinary procedures. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by stating the 
elements of negligence as derived in Muthukumarana v. Montgomery 
County, 370 Md. 447, 486, 805 A.2d 372, 395 (2002), which include 
duty, breach of that duty, an actual injury sustained, and the injury 
proximately resulted from a breach of that duty. Rhaney, 388 Md. at 
596, 880 A.2d at 363-64. The plaintiffs burden is to establish that a 
duty was breached and that the breach proximately caused the injuries. 
!d. at 596-97, 880 A.2d at 364. 
If it was established that no duty existed, then there can be no 
liability against the defendant. !d. at 597, 880 A.2d at 364. The Court 
of Appeals stated in Horridge v. St. Mary's County Dep 't of Social 
Servs., 382 Md. 170, 183, 854 A.2d 1232, 1239 (2004), that there is no 
duty to prevent a third person from causing harm to another person, 
outside of a special relationship. Rhaney, 388 Md. at 597, 880 A.2d at 
364. The Court specifically found that UMES had a landlord/tenant 
relationship with Rhaney because of the "Residence Hall Agreement" 
that governed the dormitory room where this incident occurred. !d. at 
602, 880 A.2d at 367. The premise adopted in Crown Cork & Seal 
Co. v. Kane, 213 Md. 152, 156-59, 131 A.2d 470, 472-75 (1957), is 
that a person's legal status is generally controlled by that person's 
status on the land at the time of the incident. Rhaney, 388 Md. at 602, 
880 A.2d at 367. The Court distinguished that Rhaney's status may 
have been as a business invitee anywhere else on UMES's campus. 
!d. However, the landlord/tenant relationship established UMES's 
standard of care regarding Rhaney's battery by Clark. !d. 
A landlord has a duty of reasonable care for known or reasonably 
foreseeable risks to a tenant. !d. at 598, 880 A.2d at 364. In 
Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liab. P'ship, 375 Md. 522, 537, 826 
A.2d 443, 452 (2003), the Court established "the general principal that 
a landlord 'has no obligation to maintain the leased premises for the 
safety of the tenant."' Rhaney, 388 Md. at 598, 880 A.2d at 364. The 
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Court of Appeals found that, occasionally, a duty towards a tenant 
arises because of a dangerous condition in common areas that the 
landlord controls. !d. at 598, 880 A.2d at 364-65. To be liable, the 
landlord must have actual knowledge of an activity that may affect this 
condition or should have had knowledge and foreseen the sustained 
injury. Id. at 598, 880 A.2d at 365. The Court also reiterated the need 
established by Scott v. Watson, 278 Md. 160, 169, 359 A.2d 548, 554 
(1976), to avoid "making a landlord the insurer of its tenant's safety." 
Rhaney, 388 Md. at 598, 880 A.2d at 365. 
Next, Rhaney unsuccessfully argued that UMES owed him an 
affirmative duty under a business owner/invitee relationship. /d. at 
590, 880 A.2d at 359-60. The plaintiff argued that under Southland 
Corp. v. Griffith, 332 Md. 704, 715-16, 633 A.2d 84, 89 (1993), an 
affirmative duty exists for a business owner to use reasonable and 
ordinary care in order to keep his premises safe for the purpose of 
protecting an invitee from injury caused by an unreasonable risk that 
the invitee would not discover on his or her own by exercising 
ordinary care. Rhaney, 388 Md. at 601, 880 A.2d 366-67. 
The Court of Appeals discounted Rhaney as a business invitee of 
UMES because of the explicit terms in the "Residence Hall 
Agreement," which stated that within the dormitory his status was that 
of a tenant and UMES's status was a landlord. !d. at 602, 880 A.2d at 
367. The Court of Appeals further held that even if Rhaney did have 
this business owner/invitee relationship with UMES, he would not 
succeed in litigation because of insufficient evidence, his personal 
knowledge of Clark's prior incident, and his own inaction of finding a 
new roommate. /d. at 603, 880 A.2d 367-68. 
Further, based on previous decisions by the Court of Appeals, 
UMES would be liable if Clark's presence constituted a "dangerous 
condition" and the harm that Rhaney suffered was a result ofUMES's 
actual knowledge of Clark's violent tendencies toward his future 
roommate. !d. at 599, 880 A.2d at 365. Hemmings and Scott 
demonstrated that physical dangers or conditions that contributed to 
criminal activity on the premises constituted "dangerous conditions." 
Id. at 599, 880 A.2d at 365. Scott held that a landlord maintains a duty 
of reasonable care if the landlord possessed knowledge of such 
conditions. !d. The Court of Appeals held that neither of those cases 
implied that the actual criminal act that occurred constituted a 
"dangerous condition." Id. at 599-600, 880 A.2d at 365. In Scott the 
Court further held that a landlord only has a duty to "take reasonable 
measures" in eliminating conditions that contribute to criminal 
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activity. !d. The Court of Appeals held that Clark cannot be 
considered a "dangerous condition." !d. at 600, 880 A.2d at 366. 
Furthermore, even if Clark amounted to a "dangerous condition," 
UMES would not be liable because it still did not have actual 
knowledge that Clark would batter Rhaney. !d. 
The Court of Appeals determined that one disciplinary action 
against Clark was insufficient for UMES to foresee or have knowledge 
Clark was more than a one-time offender of the UMES disciplinary 
system. !d. at 600-01, 880 A.2d at 366. Comparisons made between 
Hemmings police records of multiple crimes in an area and Scott 
noting 72 total crimes in the vicinity indicated that one incident by 
Clark remained insufficient for UMES to have had knowledge of a 
foreseeable harm being inflicted upon Rhaney. !d. at 601, 880 A.2d at 
366. 
Comparing the present case to past precedent, the Court of Appeals 
communicated an idea that only existed prior to this case through 
inference. The Court succinctly compiled the negligence standards for 
premise liability for both landlord/tenant and business owner/invitee 
relationships. A general rule of no duty against tortious acts of third 
persons that are not foreseeable was likely adopted in previous 
opinions, but has been expressly accepted in Rhaney v. University of 
Maryland Eastern Shore. 
